The role of political ideas in multi-party elections in

Tanzania: refuting essentialist explanations of

African political systems by Nyaluke, David & Connolly, Eileen
The Role of Political Ideas in Multi-Party Elections in
Tanzania: Refuting Essentialist Explanations of
African Political Systems
David Nyaluke and Eileen Connolly
School of Law and Government, Dublin City University
ABSTRACT
Negative assessments of African democracy still dominate the literature, and
Tanzania has been described as a ‘hybrid regime’—formally a multi-party
democracy where the dominant party, Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM),
engages in non-democratic practices to ensure that it remains in power,
including the manipulation of electoral processes, and in widespread neo-
patrimonial practices to protect the position of the political elite. This article
is a contribution to the criticism of neo-patrimonial and ‘hybrid-regime’
explanations of the capacity of dominant parties to retain political control in
Africa (which rest on essentialist views of African society) and to the broader
discussion of the nature of African democracy. It uses an analysis of CCM
election manifestoes from the beginning of the multi-party era in 1995,
contextualised in a discussion of political events and external perceptions of
the party, to examine the emphasis that CCM has placed on the use of
political ideas and on its responsiveness to public opinion, rather than using
the manipulation of elections and other non-democratic political practices, as
would be predicted by neo-patrimonial theory. It argues that CCM used
political ideas to hold on to popular support from the beginning of the multi-
party era to the 2010 elections, during which period its popularity has
fluctuated, while the democratic standards that applied to the running of
elections and other aspects of political life in Tanzania have continued to
improve. During this time the party developed a legitimacy narrative of
which the policies of the one-party state formed a key part, as the ideas
that they contained continued to underpin concepts of political community
in Tanzania.
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INTRODUCTION
The 1990s saw many African states introduce multi-party electoral systems,
which in many cases resulted in a political system that was dominated by a
strong party facing a much weaker and frequently fragmented opposition.
Tanzania1 is an example of such a state, as CCM, the ruling party of the
country’s single-party era, has dominated political competition since the
introduction of multi-party elections, winning all four elections between 1995
and 2010. In the decade after the third wave of democratisation in Africa,
assessments of the quality of democracy in dominant-party states tended to be
negative. Following a flawed first multi-party election in 1995, Tanzania was
described as a ‘hybrid regime’ whose political system was underpinned by
neo-patrimonial practices, because although it was formally a multi-party
democracy, it was also perceived to be engaging in non-democratic practices to
ensure that the dominant party remained in power, including the manipulation
of electoral processes,2 and to be continuing neo-patrimonial practices to
protect the position of the political elite.3 More recently, the literature has
rehabilitated the idea of dominant-party systems,4 distinguishing between
dominant-party systems that are democratic and those that are authoritarian,
Tanzania being categorised as the former.5 This literature recognises that
dominant parties can retain popular support without resorting to authoritarian
practices. However, negative assessments of African democracy still dominate
the literature, drawing on the work of Bratton and van de Walle, the leading
scholars in this area, which suggests that neo-patrimonial personal relationships
form ‘the foundation and superstructure of political institutions in Africa and
that neo-patrimonial practice is the core feature of politics in Africa’.6 As a
result, all African states have been described as sharing ‘a generalised system of
patrimonialism and an acute degree of apparent disorder’.7 Neo-patrimonial
practices have also been used to explain the prevalence of dominant parties in
sub-Saharan Africa and the consequent weakness and fragmented nature of
political opposition, as a clientelist state dominated by a strong president can
1Although Tanzania is a united republic, this paper’s analysis is based on the political
dynamics of mainland Tanzania (formerly Tanganyika). In Zanzibar those dynamics are
different, with CCM and the opposition almost equal in strength, whereas in mainland Tanzania
CCM has been much stronger than the opposition.
2Andreas Schedler, ‘Elections without democracy: the menu of manipulation’, Journal of
Democracy 13 (2) (2002), 36–50; Larry Diamond, ‘Elections without democracy: thinking about
hybrid regimes’, Journal of Democracy 13 (2) (2002), 21–35; Steven Levitsky and L.A. Way,
‘Elections without democracy: the rise of competitive authoritarianism’, Journal of Democracy 13
(2) (2002), 51–65.
3Christoper Clapham, Third World politics: an introduction (London, 1985); J.-F. Bayart, The
state in Africa: the politics of the belly (London, 1993); Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de
Walle, Democratic experiments in Africa: regime transitions in comparative perspective (Cam-
bridge, 1997); Patrick Chabal and J.-P. Daloz, Africa works: disorder as political instrument
(Bloomington, Indiana, 1999).
4Stephanie Burchard, ‘You have to know where to look in order to find it: competitiveness in
Botswana’s dominant party system’, Government and Opposition 48 (2013), 101–26, doi:10.1017/
gov.2012.1; Shumbana Karume, Party systems in the SADC region: in defence of the dominant
party system, EISA Occasional Paper no. 16 (Johannesburg, 2004), available at: www.eisa.org.za/
PDF/OP16.pdf.
5S.I. Lindberg and Jonathan Jones, ‘Laying a foundation for democracy or undermining it,
dominant parties in Africa’s burgeoning democracies’, in Matthijs Bogaards and Franc¸oise
Boucek (eds), Dominant political parties and democracy: concepts, measures, cases and
comparisons (Abingdon, Oxfordshire, 2010), 196–218.
6Bratton and van de Walle, Democratic experiments in Africa, 63.
7Chabal and Daloz, Africa works, xix.
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manipulate state resources to the detriment of the opposition.8 As neo-
patrimonial practices are considered to rest on traditional African social
norms,9 this analysis of African political systems has been criticised for being
essentialist and thereby demeaning Africans without increasing knowledge of
the social basis of African political systems.10 Consequently, a discussion of
African regimes as political communities based on shared political ideas, rather
than as ‘an assortment of individuals with only self interests’, is absent from
neo-patrimonial analysis, and this impedes an understanding of the develop-
ment of democracy and political systems in Africa.11
This article is a contribution to the criticism of neo-patrimonial and ‘hybrid-
regime’ explanations of the capacity of dominant parties to retain political
control in Africa, which rest on essentialist views of African society, and to the
broader discussion of the nature of African democracy. It uses an analysis of
CCM election manifestoes from the beginning of the multi-party era in 1995,
contextualised in a discussion of political events and external perceptions of the
party, to consider the emphasis that CCM has placed on the use of political
ideas and on its responsiveness to public opinion, rather than using the
manipulation of elections and other non-democratic political practices, as
would be predicted by the neo-patrimonial theory. It argues that CCM used
political ideas to hold on to popular support from the beginning of the multi-
party era to the 2010 elections, during which period its popularity has
fluctuated, while the democratic standards that applied to the running of
elections and other aspects of political life in Tanzania have continued to
improve. The policies of the one-party state were an important legacy that
formed a key part of the legitimacy narrative deployed by CCM, as the ideas
they contained continued to underpin concepts of political community in
Tanzania. During this time, even though the regime failed to live up to the
values and ethics of the idealised Tanzanian political community that those
ideas represented, and indeed to its own legitimacy narrative, it still positioned
itself within the framework of those values and ideals. In each election
campaign, CCM addressed its own failings and recalled its past contribution
to building the Tanzanian state as a relatively peaceful and stable country. In
doing this, it deployed a legitimacy narrative that, up to the 2010 election at
least, neither opposition political parties nor oppositional NGOs were able to
challenge successfully through the development of a more attractive counter-
narrative.
CCM AND THE FIRST MULTI-PARTY ELECTIONS
Since 1995 CCM has won all four cycles of multi-party elections. During this
period it benefited from the effort that had been put into party organisation in
the one-party-state period, including the development of an electoral system
with the result that, for many Tanzanians, multi-party elections were only a
8Nicolas van de Walle, ‘Presidentialism and clientelism in Africa’s emerging party systems’,
Journal of Modern African studies 41 (2) (2003), 297–321.
9Chabal and Daloz, Africa works, xix; Go¨ran Hyde´n, African politics in comparative
perspective (New York and Cambridge, 2006).
10Abdul Mustapha, ‘States, predation and violence: reconceptualizing political action and
political community in Africa’, Conference paper presented at the Panel on State, Political
Identity and Political Violence, tenth general assembly of CODESRIA, Kampala, Uganda, 8–12,
December 2002, 3.
11Mustapha, ‘States, predation and violence’, 6.
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continuation of the elections that had taken place since independence.12 The
one-party state’s emphasis on party-building meant that the Tanzanian political
system involved a relatively high level of public engagement in political
meetings and rallies, and even at this time the political elites were not immune
from criticism and the expression of discontent by the public.13 This is
demonstrated by the fact that from the late 1980s, during President Mwinyi’s14
administration, two interlinked policy concerns dominated public debate: first,
the need to generate economic development that benefited all Tanzanians; and,
second, the need to end corruption, which was seen to militate against poverty-
reducing economic development. These issues still dominate Tanzania today;
more than anything else, the failure to tackle corruption has been the biggest
threat to public support for CCM and has undermined the legitimacy narrative
used by the party.
The importance of corruption as a political issue in the one-party state was
demonstrated in the last election under the one-party system, in 1990. In that
election campaign the Mwinyi government made fighting corruption the key
policy issue in its manifesto.15 This was in response to public opinion, for which
‘corruption’ had become the term that embodied all that was wrong with the
government, including the failure to collect taxes,16 the endemic petty
corruption among officials17 and the fact that the interests of ordinary people
were disregarded.18 Corruption involving politicians and officials was widely
reported in both the privately owned press and the public owned media.19
Although during the election campaign the Mwinyi administration20 promised
to return to the ujamaa ideals21 of the Nyerere period, the government was still
perceived as corrupt. During its term of office it had not tackled corruption or
attempted seriously to deal with the growing economic inequality in Tanzania.22
As a result, before the first multi-party election in 1995, the CCM leadership
decided to distance itself from the unpopular Mwinyi government, even though
Mwinyi, himself, could not run for election again.23 The party strategy was to
12Joel Samoff, ‘Single-party competitive elections in Tanzania’, in Fred Hayward (ed.),
Elections in independent Africa (London, 1987), 145–89; Horoub Othman, ‘Succession politics
and the Union presidential elections’, in Rwekaza Mukandala and Horoub Othman (eds),
Liberalization and politics: the 1990 elections in Tanzania (Dar es Salaam, 2004), 134–43.
13Go¨ran Hyde´n, Beyond ujamaa in Tanzania: underdevelopment and the uncaptured peasantry
(Berkeley, California, 1980); Samoff, ‘Single-party competitive elections in Tanzania’.
14Ali Hassan Mwinyi succeeded Julius Nyerere as president of Tanzania in 1985. Before this, in
1984, a limit of two five-year terms was placed on the presidency.
15CCM, Ilani ya uchaguzi mkuu wa mwaka 1990 [General election manifesto 1990] (Dar es
Salaam, 1990).
16Samuel Mushi, ‘Patrimonialism versus institutionalisation of parties: some observations
from Tanzania’s 1995 general elections’, in S.S. Mushi and R.S. Mukandala (eds), Multi-party
democracy in transition: Tanzania’s 1995 general elections (Dar es Salaam, 1997), 3–24.
17Max Mmuya and Amon Chaligha, Towards multi-party politics in Tanzania (Dar es Salaam,
1992); Julius Nyerere, Our leadership and the destiny of Tanzania (Harare, 1995); B.E. Heilman
and P.J. Kaiser, ‘Religion, identity and politics in Tanzania’, Third World Quarterly 23 (4) (2002),
691–709.
18Michael Okema, Political culture of Tanzania (New York, 1996).
19N.R. Luanda, ‘The role of the media in the transition to multi-party politics and the 1995
general elections’, in Mushi and Mukandala, Multi-party democracy in transition, 117–48.
20CCM, Ilani ya uchaguzi mkuu wa mwaka 1990, 1–2.
21Tanzania’s African socialism and self-reliance ideology, ideas and policies.
22I.G. Shivji, ‘Electoral politics, liberalization and democracy’, in Mukandala and Othman,
Liberalization and politics (Dar es Salaam, 1994) 12–35; Mushi, ‘Patrimonialism versus
institutionalisation of parties’; Luanda, ‘Role of the media in the transition to multi-party
politics’.
23T.L. Maliyamkono, The race for the presidency: the first multi-party democracy in Tanzania
(Dar es Salaam, 1995), 21.
4 Irish Studies in International Affairs
attempt to demonstrate the personal culpability of Mwinyi, which it did by
treating the period of the Mwinyi government as an aberration and identifying
the party with the previous President Nyerere, who was considered to be not
personally corrupt and who had made fighting corruption a key party policy.24
Nyerere played a leading role in the process of distancing CCM as a party from
Mwinyi’s government. This he did both by attacking the government’s record
towards the end of its term of office and by taking an active part in the selection
of the party’s presidential candidate,25 Benjamin Mkapa, and subsequently in
Mkapa’s presidential election campaign.26
The intervention by Nyerere was critical to CCM’s capacity to stage a strong
campaign against the opposition party, NCCR–Maguezi. From a weak
position, that party had gained support after the defection of Augustine
Mrema (a former CCM government minister and deputy prime minister who
had taken a strong anti-corruption stance) from CCM to become its
presidential candidate. Mrema claimed to have left the government and the
ruling party after a disagreement with the Mwinyi government over the
handling of corruption issues,27 but his defection coincided with the anticipated
passing of a rule requiring CCM presidential candidates to be university
graduates, which would have ruled him out. The defection of Mrema gave the
opposition a strong presidential candidate, and in these circumstances Nyerere’s
intervention in support of CCM was considered crucial: as leader of the
independence struggle, he was the lynchpin connecting the idealistic past of
Tanzania, and therefore the regime party, to the present. The period of
Nyerere’s presidency was frequently favourably compared to conditions in
1995,28 and he, himself, made it a campaigning point that he had led a
government that was tough on corruption.29 CCM benefited from the fact that
he was respected as baba wa taifa, the ‘father of nation’,30 that he attracted large
crowds whenever he spoke, and that both the private and the public media
broadcast his speeches. During the election campaign the the state radio
station, Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam, broadcast Nyerere’s previous speeches
in a programme called Wosia wa baba wa taifa (‘The words of advice of the
father of the nation’) after the main evening news bulletin, ensuring a large
audience.
As well as harnessing the popularity and status of Nyerere as the first leader
of independent Tanzania, CCM, in its 1995 election manifesto, drew strongly
on what were widely seen as the positive achievements of the one-party state,
exploiting Tanzanians’ perceptions of what was positive about their country.
The manifesto stated that CCM was a political party ‘which unlike other parties
in Africa has succeeded in fulfilling its historic mission of building national
24R.S. Mukandala, ‘Wither ujamaa: ideological premises of the 1990 elections’, in Mukandala
and Othman, Liberalization and politics, 54–65: 57.
25Nyerere, Our leadership and the destiny of Tanzania, 15–22; C.K. Omari, ‘Factors which
influenced voters’, in C.K. Omari (ed.), The right to choose a leader (Dar es Salaam, 1997), 5–96.
26Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee (TEMCO), The 1995 general elections in
Tanzania: report of the Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee (Dar es Salaam, 1995); Omari,
‘Factors which influenced voters’.
27Mwandishi Wetu, ‘Mrema akimbia rushwa CCM’ [‘Mrema runs away from corruption in
CCM’], Mwananchi, 3 March 1995.
28I.G. Shivji, ‘Electoral politics, liberalization and democracy’; Okema, Political culture of
Tanzania.
29Julius Nyerere, ‘Nyufa’ [‘Cracks’], speech given on 13 March 1995, Kilimanjaro Hotel, Dar
es Salaam, copy printed by the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation, 15–22.
30Okema, Political culture of Tanzania.
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unity [umoja wa kitaifa] and of building peace and tranquillity [amani na
utulivu]’.31 The manifesto emphasised that ‘the work of building national unity
so that the citizens feel that they are people of one nation’ did not happen
automatically but was achieved on the basis of policy choices made by the party
and that, in contrast, there are ‘policies of political parties and governments
which lead to the building of national unity and there are policies that build
misunderstanding, hatred and mistrust in a state’.32 To underscore this point, it
linked the policies of CCM to those of TANU (the Tanganyika African
National Union) and ASP (the Afro-Shiraz Party), which it described as ‘seeds,
which have grown unity, love, solidarity and trust among the men and women of
Tanzania’.33 Other policies focused on by the manifesto included ujamaa na
kujitegemea (‘socialism and self-reliance’), and policies against tribalism,
religious intolerance, racism, sexism and regionalism.34 The analysis in the
manifesto is very clear: ‘African countries whose party and government failed to
have these correct CCM policies have failed until now to have national unity.
The people in these countries still face conflicts based on ethnicity, religion, and
regionalism.’35 CCM also used the issue of national unity, described in the
document as a state of peace and tranquillity (amani na utulivu), to attack the
opposition, saying that its leaders advocated positions that would lead to
‘disunity in the nation, rupture and hatred in the country’.36
CCM’s record of managing crises, major changes and times of uncertainty
was emphasised in the manifesto, with two examples cited that had strong
resonance in the public imagination: the 1974–5 famine and the war with
Uganda in 1978–9.37 It included the party’s handling of the 1980s economic
crisis, which was not perceived as positive by the general public, pointing out
that the crisis had affected the whole of Africa but that it was owing to CCM’s
economic policies that the country was now experiencing economic growth.38 In
this context, the strength of the party structure was discussed because of the
perceived advantage that it gave it over the opposition parties. It allowed CCM
to criticise other parties for being dependent on a single prominent party
leader,39 while it could portray itself as the most capable organisation to entrust
with running the country.
The party’s policy on fighting corruption that featured so prominently in the
manifesto was linked to reform within the party, as CCM believed that the
public’s perception of whether or not the party’s leadership was corrupt would
be a major factor in the election. The manifesto stated that the issue of the
‘integrity and honesty of the party leaders’ was the main problem facing CCM
and the government. It therefore promised that, if elected, it would in the next
five years effectively implement section 18 of the CCM constitution, prohibiting
corrupt practices, as well as the laws on the ethics of state leaders that had been
passed by the parliament in 1995.40 While promising reform, the party also
recognised that some past leaders had not followed the party’s constitution and
31CCM, Ilani ya uchaguzi ya CCM kwa ajili ya uchaguzi mkuu wa mwaka 1995 [Election
manifesto of CCM for the general election 1995] (Dodoma, 1995), 83.
32CCM, Ilani ya uchaguzi 1995, 83.
33CCM, Ilani ya uchaguzi 1995, 83.
34CCM, Ilani ya uchaguzi 1995, 84.
35CCM, Ilani ya uchaguzi 1995, 84.
36CCM, Ilani ya uchaguzi 1995, 84.
37CCM, Ilani ya uchaguzi 1995, 85–6.
38CCM, Ilani ya uchaguzi 1995, 84.
39CCM, Ilani ya uchaguzi 1995, 87–8.
40CCM, Ilani ya uchaguzi 1995, 88–9.
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that this had undermined the trust of CCM members and of the general public
in the CCM leadership.41
The manifesto set the tone of the political content of CCM’s election
campaign. Campaign speeches by CCM leaders and the presidential candidate,
Mkapa, highlighted the party’s commitment to fighting corruption.42 The
campaign also questioned the personal capacity of some opposition leaders to
work as a team, especially the major opponent in the presidential race, Mrema.
The CCM national newspaper, Uhuru, pointed to emerging problems in his
party, NCCR–Maguezi, claiming that Mrema was violating joint decisions
made by the party and that he could not take advice.43 Another recurring
argument made by CCM candidates was that the opposition was incapable of
maintaining national unity, ‘peace and tranquillity’. Related to this was the
criticism that the opposition parties did not have nationwide support and could
only carve out niche support either on a regional or a religious basis. The
opposition was also attacked for being too dogmatic, which was seen not only
as dangerous for peace but also as going against the collegiality, compromise
and collective resolution of conflict that CCM argued had achieved national
unity in Tanzania.44
CCM’s election campaign message was that it had been popularly responsive
in the past and that, given a chance, it would refocus and be responsive and
accountable to the people of Tanzania in the future. The campaign made
tremendous efforts to distance CCM from the Mwinyi government, which had
significantly reduced the party’s legitimacy and popularity. Nyerere, with his
unparalleled status as ‘father of the nation’, played a critical role in ensuring
that the electorate received this message. In its election manifesto and the public
campaign, CCM highlighted past successes and asked for public support based
on this record and on its status as the heir of the national liberation movement.
CCM won the presidential election with 62% of the votes and the
parliamentary elections with 59% of the votes; the next-largest party in
mainland Tanzania (Mrema’s NCCR–Mageuzi) got 28% and 22%, respectively.
CCM won 186 constituency seats out of 232, and NCCR–Mageuzi 16. The
Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee (TEMCO),45 a local independent
consortium of election observers set up to monitor the first multi-party
election, considered the 1995 election to be free but not fair. The TEMCO
report shows that, even though there was no evidence of widespread and
systematic manipulation by the leadership of CCM, the administration of the
election was faulty and various actions had been taken on a local and ad hoc
basis to skew it in favour of CCM. Problems occurred at all stages of the
election process, including registration of voters, nomination of candidates by
the Electoral Commission, campaigning, voting, vote counting and announce-
ment of results. Bratton and Posner pointed out that the opposition parties
41CCM, Ilani ya uchaguzi 1995, 88.
42Kassam Kassam, ‘Rushwa Mrema na Mkapa nani ataiweza?’ [‘Corruption: Mrema and
Mkapa: who can handle it?’], Wasaa, 21–7 August 1995.
43‘Mgogoro mkubwa wafukuta NCCR—yadaiwa Mrema haambiliki’ [‘Major crisis looming
in NCCR—it is claimed that Mrema will not listen’], Uhuru, 18 September 1995.
44Tarimo Magunisi, Ernest Kidulile and John Ngwalungwa, ‘Barua kwa mhariri’ [‘Letters to
the editor’, with complaints about the opposition being divisive and too aggressive], Uhuru, 17
and 27 September 1995.
45TEMCO is an independent initiative led by the Political Science Department, University of
Dar es Salaam, and comprising a number of NGOs, which was established to observe and
monitor elections and to issue independent reports; most members are academics. See: http://
www.temco.udsm.ac.tz/ (12 September 2013).
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faced many hurdles and that the incumbent party manoeuvred to ensure its
victory.46 They highlighted that, for example, opposition parties could get only
limited access to government-controlled electronic media, most notably Radio
Tanzania Dar es Salaam, the only radio station with national coverage. They
also noted that the polling was so chaotic in the capital that it had to be rerun,
and they concluded that ‘the country’s first multiparty contest since indepen-
dence dismayed many Tanzanians’.47 TEMCO found that manipulation during
the voter-registration stage included registering prisoners to vote in the Kilosa
district constituency and under-age persons, mostly secondary-school students,
in the Bagamoyo constituency. It also found that CCM representatives used the
threat that services would be denied to those who registered to vote for the
opposition in Ruvuma constituency, that non-citizens in border areas were
registered as voters and that there were claims of widespread intimidation by
CCM when conducting a voter-intentions survey in the Dar es Salaam and
Songea Urban constituencies.48 Officials put obstacles in the way of the
nomination of opposition candidates, generating a large number of complaints
about the rejection by returning officers of the nomination of opposition-party
candidates. Opposition-party nominations were declined in at least twenty
constituencies, and on no occasion was a CCM candidate objected to; however,
none of these rejections involved the nominations of the main opposition party,
NCCR–Mageuzi.49
It is doubtful that the corrupt practices in the running of the 1995 election
had a major impact on the level of support for CCM; it is more likely that the
intervention of Nyerere was decisive. CCM had instituted multi-party elections
in the absence of an organised civil society or political opposition, so going into
the first election, it faced a weak and fragmented position until the defection of
Mrema gave a boost to NCCR–Mageuzi. However, given the widespread public
discontent with CCM and with the level of corruption in Tanzanian public life
before 1995, it appeared likely that an opposition party would grow in strength
after the first multi-party election.
IMPLEMENTING THE MANIFESTO AND THE 2000 ELECTIONS
After the election, one of the first actions of the Mkapa government, in January
1996, was to appoint a presidential commission on corruption, tasked with
investigating the causes of corruption in Tanzania.50 Judge and former prime
minister of Tanzania, Joseph Warioba, who was a respected politician, was
appointed chairperson.51 As a result of the details contained in the commis-
sion’s report (also known as the Warioba Report), published in 1996, the
minister of public works and some of his staff were prosecuted for corruption in
46Michael Bratton and D.N. Posner, ‘A first look at second elections in Africa, with
illustrations from Zambia’, in Richard Joseph (ed.), State, conflict and democracy in Africa
(London, 1999), 377–407: 383.
47Bratton and Posner, ‘A first look at second elections in Africa’, 383.
48TEMCO, The 1995 general elections in Tanzania, 48–9.
49TEMCO, The 1995 general elections in Tanzania, 78–9.
50United Republic of Tanzania, Presidential Commission of Inquiry against Corruption: report
of the Commission on Corruption (2 vols, Dar es Salaam, 1996), vol. 1, 1 (the Commission is
otherwise known as Warioba Commission).
51Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF) and Front Against Corrupt Elements in
Tanzania (FACEIT), The state of corruption in Tanzania (Dar es Salaam, 2002), 7.
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the awarding of road-construction contracts.52 The Prevention of Corruption
Bureau was also strengthened,53 and the government inaugurated the Ethics
Secretariat with the mandate to oversee the actions of politicians and public
servants.54 In June 1996 the government Gazette published details of procedures
that members of the public could follow to view records of the wealth and debts
of politicians and senior public servants.55 In 2000, before the second multi-
party elections, the government established the Commission for Human Rights
and Good Governance and a new ministerial post to coordinate good-
governance activities. Although these could have been seen by the public as
anti-corruption actions, they also reflected the priorities of donors and trends in
international aid policies at that time. This commission replaced the Permanent
Commission of Inquiry, established in 1965,56 and was tasked with protecting
the human rights of Tanzanians vis-a-vis public and private institutions.
According to Judge Kisanga, its chairperson, the commission dealt with
10,315 complaints, 2,237 of which were inherited from the Permanent
Commission of Inquiry; 99% of the complaints concerned issues of ‘good
governance’, and only 1% related to human-rights violations.57
These efforts to fight corruption, even though they did not eliminate it,
demonstrated that the government appeared to be dealing with the issue and
gave a sense that CCM was now filling the leadership vacuum that had existed
at the heart of the Mwinyi government.58 The donor community—and even, to
some extent, opposition leaders—appreciated that Mkapa provided effective
leadership during this period.59
The other main policy area that the government dealt with was improving
the economy in order to increase government funds to pay for social and
economic services and to repay the national debt. Up to the 1995 elections,
donors had reduced support for Tanzania, accusing the government of failing
to collect taxes and allowing too many tax exemptions and evasions.60 The
Mkapa government introduced measures to improve tax collection and a
number of reforms to ensure the country’s transformation into a market
economy, with the result that the donor community began increasing aid to
Tanzania.61 Improvements in tax collection also meant that the government was
dealing with some of the corruption in this area, as evidenced by the fact that,
in its the second year, the minister of finance had to resign because he
authorised a tax exception for a cooking-oil importer.62
52Tanzania, Presidential Commission of Inquiry against Corruption, vol. 1, 269–70.
53Robert Kissanga, ‘Haki za binadamu na utawala bora’ [‘Human rights and good
governance’], in Research and Education for Democracy in Tanzania Project (REDET), Serikali
ya awamu ya tatu: tathmini ya utendaji wake [The third phase of government: evaluation of its
implementation work], REDET Book Programme 13 (Dar es Salaam, 2006), 294–304: 303.
54Jaji W. Maina, ‘Maadili ya uongozi’ [‘Ethics of leadership’], in REDET, Serikali ya awamu ya
tatu, 306–18.
55Maina, ‘Maadili ya uongozi’, 311–12.
56Kissanga, ‘Haki za binadamu na utawala bora’, 295–6.
57Kissanga, ‘Haki za binadamu na utawala bora’, 300.
58T.L. Maliyamkono, Tanzania on the move (Dar es Salaam, 1997).
59Maliyamkono, Tanzania on the move, 27–8.
60Kajubi Mkajanga, ‘TZ kukatiwa misaada kutokana na rushwa, kukusanya kodi’ [‘TZ to be
denied aid because of corruption, tax collection’], Heko, 27 April–3 May 1995.
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With the formation of opposition parties and the introduction of multi-party
elections, women and young people became critical constituents in the 1995
election.63 However, in spite of this, immediately after the election CCM
accused women’s NGOs, particularly BAWATA, the Tanzanian Women’s
Council, of mobilising women politically against CCM and in support of the
opposition.64 BAWATA’s alleged involvement in politics during the 1995
election campaign resulted in its being banned under the law prohibiting
NGOs from undertaking political activities.65 This demonstrated CCM’s
intolerance for opposition, provided that it could take action against dissenting
groups without risking wider public support.
Despite the limited policy space and dependency on external funds, the
Mkapa administration managed to restore confidence in CCM and put it on a
good footing for the 2000 elections. Demonstrating that the Mkapa government
was aware of the need to at least appear to fulfil the promises it made in 1995,
CCM in 1997 formed a party committee to evaluate the implementation of the
1995 election promises and recommend areas of focus for the 2000 election.66
As a result, the CCM 2000 election manifesto, unlike that of 1995, focused
more on the economy and the fight against corruption than on the historical
record of the party. It still included what CCM considered the regime’s long-
term achievement of maintaining a peaceful and united nation, but its focus was
more on the current policies and challenges of government.
In the 2000 manifesto, unlike that of 1995, the introduction dealt with the
modernisation of the economy as the main challenge. The focus of the party
and its government was ‘to build the foundations of a modern economy’, as ‘the
Tanzania economy currently is still backward and dependent’.67 Also different
from the 1995 manifesto was that the 2000 manifesto was keen to highlight
successes in a range of policy areas since the CCM had come into government
in 1995. To do this, the manifesto gave a separate section to each policy area
and set out the successes achieved, the challenges remaining and the
government’s policy proposals for the next term, should it be elected. Using
this format, the 2000 manifesto detailed the government’s achievements against
corruption. It claimed that the ‘fight against corruption is the promise and
policy of TANU, ASP and CCM…the Government has taken courageous steps
to fight corruption inside CCM.’68 In the next five-year period ‘the government
will continue to take legal, administrative and disciplinary measures against
those that are discovered participating in corruption activities’.69
The economy was perceived as CCM’s most successful policy area since the
1995 election, and it was determined to make this the defining issue of the
election campaign. The 2000 election manifesto highlighted that ‘under CCM
leadership the government has made major changes in policies dealing with the
economy and social welfare’ that resulted in higher economic growth, a major
63C.K. Omari, ‘Factors which influenced voters’.
64M. Milinga, ‘BAWATA yampigia debe Mrema’ [‘BAWATA campaigns for Mrema’], Uhuru,
23 September 1995.
65C.M. Peter, The state and independent civil organisations: the case of Tanzania Women’s
Council (BAWATA), Civil Society and Governance in East Africa Project (Dar es Salaam, 1999).
66CCM, Taarifa ya Kamati ya NEC kuhusu mikakati ya kusukuma utekelezaji wa ilani ya
uchaguzi wa CCM wa mwaka 1995 [Report of the NEC Committee on strategies to push
implementation of the 1995 CCM election manifesto] (Dodoma, 1997).
67CCM, Ilani ya uchaguzi ya CCM kwa ajili ya uchaguzi mkuu wa mwaka 2000 [Election
manifesto of CCM for the general election 2000] (Dodoma, 1995), 1.
68CCM, Ilani ya uchaguzi 2000, 94.
69CCM, Ilani ya uchaguzi 2000, 95–7.
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reduction in the rate of inflation and continued improvements in the rate of tax
collection.70 The manifesto also detailed achievements and challenges in adult
education, health, water services in towns and villages, and the development of
housing; given the importance of young people and women as strong
constituents in the battle for votes, the two groups had sections devoted
specifically to addressing their problems.71
An election study group from the University of Dar es Salaam summarised
the issues that were detailed at the inaugural rally of CCM’s 2000 election
campaign as controlling inflation; the government’s good record on managing
the economy; the successful privatisation of some public enterprises; and what
CCM described as the intensification of the war against corruption. Despite not
giving it the exclusive prominence that it had in 1995, the party also drew on its
historical legitimacy gained from building a society in Tanzania that was
relative peaceful compared to the rest of Africa. To this achievement it added
that the CCM government was the initiator of the political reforms that had led
to the reintroduction of multi-party elections.72
The opposition parties that contested the elections in 2000 were weaker and
more fragmented than they had been in 1995. The response to CCM’s political
platform was an attempt to prove that less progress has been made in these
areas than CCM claimed.73 The result of the 2000 elections confirmed CCM’s
recovery, as it got 72% of the presidential vote and 65% of the vote in the
general election, an increase of 10% and 5%, respectively. The party won 202
constituency seats out of 232. The largest opposition party of the 1995 election,
NCCR–Mageuzi, had almost disappeared: it won only one constituency seat.
The remaining votes were shared between three small parties. The independent
election monitors of TEMCO concluded that the election was free but unfair.
This time, however, the unfairness did not stem from any suspected acts of
sabotage by CCM but mainly from incumbent advantages enabling CCM to use
state resources:
Unfairness comes from the big state bias in favour of the ruling party, the
heavy handedness of the police in campaign rallies of the opposition parties,
and the incomplete separation of state resources from those of the ruling
party.74
Although these were all undesirable features of the political system, they
were not sufficient to account for the weakness of the opposition and its poor
showing in the elections.
ANOTHER NEW BEGINNING IN THE 2005 ELECTIONS
Unlike the first term of Mkapa’s presidency, in his second term, although the
government kept up the momentum of reforms in the economy and other policy
areas, there were growing problems in managing the spending of national
revenues, public assets and natural resources that implicated the government in
an intractable web of corruption reminiscent of the Mwinyi era. For example, a
major corruption scandal occurred in the provision of electrical power. To deal
with power shortages, the government entered into a contract with Independent
Power Transmission Limited (IPTL) to supply electricity, and the very high cost
70CCM, Ilani ya uchaguzi 2000, 9.
71CCM, Ilani ya uchaguzi 2000, 100–4.
72Mmuya and Chaligha, Towards multi-party politics in Tanzania.
73Ernest Mallya, ‘Campaign issues in the 2000 general elections in Tanzania’, African Review
28 (1–2) (2001), special issue on the 2000 general elections in Tanzania, 35–54.
74TEMCO, The 1995 general elections in Tanzania, 48–9, 198–9.
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of this contract was assumed to be evidence of corruption.75 Another scandal
surrounded the purchase of radar from British Aerospace (BAE). The move
was highly disputed not only because Tanzania had bought military radar for
civil use but also because corruption was involved, with inflated prices and
political representatives receiving personal payments.76 Although the Tanzanian
government avoided dealing with the latter case, investigations were conducted
in the UK by an anti-corruption agency, which found BAE officials guilty of
corruption and ordered the company to pay compensation to Tanzania.77
These and other instances of corruption were the subject of public debate,
and accusations of corruption on the part of politicians and government
officials came from a diverse range of sources, including parliamentarians, civil-
society organisations and the media.78 The national radio station, Radio
Tanzania Dar es Salaam, as well as other public and private broadcasters, was
broadcasting parliamentary proceedings, making the public aware of the
parliamentary responses to these accusations of corruption. Corruption was
a topic frequently discussed on talk shows on television and radio and covered
in the newspapers, with religious leaders being among those who condemned
the government.79 Despite this pressure, the Mkapa government was slow and
unwilling to deal with the allegations of corruption that emerged during its
second term,80 and no significant progress was achieved in investigating and
prosecuting any corruption case that had been the subject of public debate81—
for example, the Warioba Report had named 70 corrupt officials and political
leaders, but there were no prosecutions.82 As a result, there was a strong public
perception that corruption had not been dealt with.83 There was also
dissatisfaction with the extent to which improved macro-economic stability
and growth had been translated into benefits for Tanzanians en masse.84 The
Mkapa government’s failures in fighting corruption and extending economic
benefits to a majority of Tanzanians set the tone for the 2005 election. This
meant that, as in 1995, CCM had to recover from a reduced level of public
support.
In the 2005 election CCM rebounded, thanks to a presidential candidate
who, in the eyes of the Tanzania political community, embodied many of the
desirable properties of the leader that the country needed after the failures of
75Kelsall, ‘Governance, democracy, and recent political struggle’, 55–82, 70.
76Kelsall, ‘Governance, democracy, and recent political struggle’, 71.
77BBC, ‘BAE Systems fined for Tanzania accounting offence’, 21 December 2010, available at:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12049723 (14 September 2012).
78Tanzania had permitted private media from 1986.
79Benson Bagonza, ‘Uzoefu waviongozi wa dini katika kujenga imani ya jamii na amani’ [‘The
experience of church leaders in building community trust and peace’], in REDET, Ujenzi wa
imani ya jamii na amani Tanzania [Building community trust and peace in Tanzania] (Dar es
Salaam, 2005), 67–84; Method Kilaini, ‘Uzoefu wa viongozi wa dini katika kujenga imani ya
jamii na amani’ [‘The experience of church leaders in building community trust and peace’], in
REDET, Ujenzi wa imani ya jamii na amani Tanzania, 172–94.
80Kelsall, ‘Governance, democracy, and recent political struggle’, 70.
81ESRF and FACEIT, The state of corruption in Tanzania.
82Kelsall, ‘Governance, democracy, and recent political struggle’, 70.
83ESRF and FACEIT, The state of corruption in Tanzania; Joseph Warioba, ‘Ujenzi wa
mwafaka wa kitaifa’ [‘Building national consensus’], in REDET, Ujenzi wa imani ya jamii na
amani Tanzania, 210–26.
84‘Economic growth too small to reduce poverty’, Guardian (Tanzania), 15 June 2000; Joyce
Mkinga, ‘Open policies and privatisation not solution to poverty—opinion’, Guardian
(Tanzania), 16 March 2000, 2; Kelsall, ‘Governance, democracy, and recent political struggle’;
Servacius Likwelile, ‘Tathmini ya mkakati wa kupunguza umasikini wakati wa serikali ya awamu
ya tatu’ [‘Evaluation of the poverty reduction strategy of the third phase of government’], in
REDET, Serikali ya awamu ya tatu, 65–83.
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both Mwinyi and Mkapa. In the 2005 CCM primaries,85 Jakaya Kikwete
emerged as the presidential candidate. For the previous ten years, he had been
seen as a presidential candidate in waiting. In 1995 he had been a candidate in
the presidential primaries, supported by the party’s youth wing, which was
seeking a generational change of leadership. In the first round of the 1995
primaries Kikwete was the frontrunner, with Mkapa taking second place. In the
second round Mkapa came in ahead of Kikwete. Mkapa then chose Kikwete as
foreign minister for both terms of his government. During this time Kikwete
built a network that would facilitate his election campaign both within and
outside the party.86
Kikwete was a popular choice with the general public, as well as the party.
He was comparatively young and energetic, with an attractive public persona
and a good political track record in the party and in government positions. In
the Mwinyi government he had been a junior minister in the Ministry of Energy
and Minerals and later became minister of finance. He avoided being tarnished
with the poor reputation of that government, as he was perceived to have
personally taken an anti-corruption stance and had removed corrupt officials
and introduced financial-management reforms in both ministries in which he
served. In fact, he was brought in to the Ministry of Finance specifically to
cleanse it of corruption in order to restore the faith of donors and of Tanzanians
in the government’s financial control of the state.87 In the Foreign Ministry in
Mkapa’s government Kikwete enhanced his reputation through his involvement
in the key role that Tanzania played in conflict resolution and peace-building in
East Africa and the Great Lakes Region.88 There was euphoric support for
Kikwete when he announced his candidacy in 2005.89 Religious leaders also
supported him, including Christian churches: for example, Bishop Kulola
proclaimed that Kikwete (a Muslim) was ‘the choice of God’.90
The 2005 CCM manifesto highlighted the key election message from
Kikwete, stating in bold letters covering two pages: ‘A better life for every
Tanzanian, with new zeal, new strength and new speed a Tanzania of plenty is
possible’.91 The manifesto, in a similar style to that of 2000, highlighted the
party’s promises for the next five years. It stated that the achievements of the
Mkapa years had laid the foundations for the fight against corruption, claiming
that there had been many successes that resulted in increased government
revenue and that many corrupt officials had been dismissed.92 However, as
fighting corruption was still an important unfinished agenda for the legitimacy
85CCM holds primary elections to select its candidates for presidential and parliamentary
elections.
86P.M. Bagenda, Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete: Tumaini lililorejea [Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete: The hope
that has returned] (Dar es Salaam, 2006).
87Bagenda, Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete:Ttumaini lililorejea.
88Mohabe Nyirabu, ‘Mambo ya nje na ushirikiano wa kikanda wakati wa awamu ya tatu’
[‘Foreign affairs and regional cooperation during the third phase’, in REDET, Serikali ya awamu
ya tatu, 319–39.
89Leonard Shayo, ‘Mawazo sanifu’ [‘Cutting-edge ideas’], unpublished book draft given to the
authors during an interview with Professor Shayo in 2006. Professor Shayo was a lecturer in
mathematics and computer science, and founder and chairperson of Chama cha Demokrasia
Makini (Party of Cutting-edge Democracy); he passed away in 2008.
90Moses Kulola, ‘Pamoja na matatizo yanayoindama nchi, Askofu Kulola asisitiza Kikwete ni
chaguo la Mungu’ [‘Despite the problems that the country faces, Bishop Kulola insists Kikwete is
a choice of God’], Nyakati, 5–11 November 2006. Many Christian religious leaders supported
Kikwete’s candidacy for the presidency even though he is a Muslim.
91CCM, Ilani ya uchaguzi ya CCM kwa ajili ya uchaguzi mkuu wa mwaka 2005 [Election
manifesto of CCM for the general election 2005] (Dodoma, 2005), 2.
92CCM, Ilani ya uchaguzi 2005, 3.
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of any CCM government, Kikwete promised, both in the manifesto and in his
inaugural presidential address to parliament, to consolidate the war against
corruption.93 Apart from implementing existing policies, the manifesto pro-
mised to follow up accusations from ordinary people of suspected corruption
and to deal more vigorously with complaints of corruption in state institutions,
including the police, hospitals, schools and courts94. Kikwete promised to
‘continue to increase openness in government decision-making processes,
especially in procurement and contracts’.95
As in the 2000 manifesto, the economy was seen as the major policy area,
and it was one in which CCM felt that it was on strong ground. The party’s
economic message was very similar to that of 2000, defining the problem facing
the government in terms of the fundamental tasks of developing the economy
(including moving Tanzania to a position where it was not dependent on the
international donor community), providing employment for all Tanzanians and
eradicating poverty.96
The way in which the Kikwete campaign framed the main policy areas
focused on in the campaign (the economy and the fight against corruption) was
a direct response to the successes and failures of the Mkapa government. The
focus of the Kikwete campaign on bringing prosperity to all Tanzanians
responded to the fact that the Mkapa government, despite doing well
economically, had been criticised for failing to translate the economic success
into reduced inequality and poverty. This failure was demonstrated by the word
that Tanzanians had given to a situation of economic growth accompanied by
growing inequality, ukapa, derived from Mkapa’s name.97 On corruption, the
promise in the manifesto to act on the complaints of ordinary people and to be
more open about government decisions was a reply to the criticism that the
reforms of the Mkapa government had dealt with petty corruption but had left
serious corruption by those in leadership positions untouched.98
Kikwete proved to be an extremely popular candidate who captured the
public imagination with a promise of effective leadership that would enable him
to implement the key election promises.99 As a result, the decline in CCM
support was reversed, and it won 80% of votes in the presidential race, 10%more
than in 2000, and 70% in the general election, winning 206 constituent seats out
of 232. In addition to this, TEMCO declared the 2005 elections free and fair.100
CORRUPTION AND THE 2010 ELECTIONS
On the question of corruption, external assessments of the performance of the
Kikwete presidency during its first term in office found that the government
had failed to live up to its election promises. This negative assessment was a
feature of public debate from the end of the first year of his government and
included criticism of the government’s failure to implement the promise to
93Jakaya Kikwete, ‘Speech by the president of the United Republic of Tanzania, His
Excellency Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, on inaugurating the fourth phase parliament of the United
Republic of Tanzania’, Parliament Buildings, Dodoma, 30 December 2005, available at: http://
parliament.go.tz/docs/pspeech_en.pdf.
94CCM, Ilani ya uchaguzi 2005, 8–9.
95CCM, Ilani ya uchaguzi 2005, 38.
96CCM, Ilani ya uchaguzi 2005, 8–9.
97Kelsall, ‘Governance, democracy, and recent political struggle’, 65.
98Kelsall, ‘Governance, democracy, and recent political struggle’.
99Bagenda, Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete: Tumaini lililorejea.
100TEMCO, The 2005 general elections in Tanzania: report of the Tanzania Election Monitoring
Committee (Dar es Salaam, 2005).
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review all major government contracts, which Kikwete had made in his
inaugural address to parliament in 2005. By the end of the first year of
Kikwete’s presidency, there were calls in the media and parliament for a review
of contracts and for stronger anti-corruption measures.101 The Kikwete
government not only failed to review government contracts made during the
Mkapa government but also entered into new contracts that were also corrupt.
One such contract was particularly damaging for Kikwete’s credibility in that it
had a significant and direct impact on the public and on the economy of
Tanzania. The contract involved an American company, Richmond Develop-
ment Corporation (RDC), contracted to supply supplemental electrical power
to Dar es Salaam. The company had failed to supply the power after the
minister concerned had extended several deadlines. The result of this failure was
power-rationing that continued even after a deadline negotiated with the
president to supply power by October 2006,102 and it was not until early 2007
that the company actually started to supply power. Members of parliament and
opposition-party leaders called for all of those implicated in the scandal to be
held accountable, but the government prevented a full parliamentary inquiry
until November 2007. The findings of this inquiry implicated the prime minister
and two ministers in the corrupt practices that resulted in awarding the contract
to RDC103 and forced their resignation in February 2008, making Edward
Lowassa the first prime minister, and the first political leader of significance,
since the founding of the Tanzanian state to resign because of corruption.
Despite the resignation of the prime minister and two ministers, the media
and opposition parties continued to pressure the government to deal with all
corruption scandals. The government did not respond with significant measures
and was perceived to have failed to reduce levels of corruption substantially or
even to ensure that the government, itself, was free from corruption.
The self-perception of CCM at the end of Kikwete’s first five-year term was
that its economic policy had been relatively successful. Even though there was
an acute shortage of power in the first year and a drought in the second year,
the government managed to achieve an economic growth rate of 7.1%, and
inflation was reduced from 12% in 2009 to 4% in 2010.104 In spite of the positive
spin that CCM put on its economic policy, economic growth had not been seen
to improve the living standards of the majority of Tanzanians or to reduce
poverty—in fact, increasing inflation reduced living standards for most of
Kikwete’s first five years in government, even though it fell in the final year—
and this reduced the support for CCM and weakened Kikwete’s position of
before the 2010 elections. In an address to the parliament at the end of his
presidential term, Kikwete explained the failure to fulfil the promises on
economic policy made in the 2005 election campaign as being the result of the
drought conditions that had affected the country in this period, the increase in
101For example see, Mutekanga Isidory, ‘Serikali inalipa IPTL pesa nyingi mno’ [‘The
government is paying IPTL too much money’], Tanzania Daima, 12 November 2006, 12; Joyce
Kisaka and Lukas Lukumbo, ‘MPs demand to know more about Alex Stewart’, Sunday Citizen,
12 November 2006; Commonwealth Secretariat, Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group:
Tanzania general elections 31 October 2010 (London, 2011).
102Deogratias Kishombo, ‘Power rationing: who will compensate poor Tanzanians?’, Hill
Observer, November 2006.
103Harrison Mwakyembe, ‘Report of the select committee formed by the parliament of the
United Republic of Tanzania on 13 December 2007 to investigate the tendering process for
emergency power supply which awarded the tender to Richmond Development Company LLC of
Houston, Texas, USA, in 2006’, available at: http://ebookbrowse.com/tanzania-select-cttee-h-
mwakyembe-richmond-execsummary-eng-feb08-doc-d112761644 (12 September 2013).
104Kikwete, ‘Speech by the president’.
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oil prices and the global economic crisis.105 It is probable that, had it not been
for the problems of corruption affecting Kikwete’s government, he and the
CCM would have weathered the discontent with the results of their economic
policy. However, corruption became the main political issue, especially with the
resignation of the prime minister and two other members of government;
economic failures became inseparable from corruption, and corruption was
identified as the main problem.
In response to this prevailing situation, the CCM 2010 election manifesto
restated the regime’s commitment to fighting corruption, proclaiming that
corruption was an obstacle to national development and that the damage done
by ‘those who give and receive bribes can spread in all sectors of the society and
cause a major erosion of accountability and undermine the ethics of leaders’.106
The manifesto outlined the measures that the party would take in government
from 2010 to 2015, which included improving the system of investigation,
educating citizens and public servants, and enhancing the capacity of state
instruments to fight corruption.107 CCM also promised to improve performance
in all other policy sectors. On corruption, the regime claimed that it had made
progress, and it promised to do more. It pointed to resignations, convictions
and the number of corruption cases filed by the government in the courts, but
this also had negative consequences for the campaign, as some of the cases
involved CCM politicians who were contesting the 2010 general election. In its
defence, CCM argued that it did not bar these candidates from contesting the
election because they had not yet been found guilty in law.108
Opposition parties within and outside parliament argued that CCM was the
party of mafisadi (‘thieves of public property’), who were protecting each other
and had failed to fight corruption.109 Given the public’s anger at corruption,
these messages struck a chord with voters. The failure to fight corruption was
responsible for a drop in Kikwete’s electoral support. As presidential candidate,
he polled 64% of the votes in 2010, in contrast to 80% in 2005. The party also
got fewer seats in parliament, winning just 186 of 232—a significant drop from
the 206 it won in 2005. The opposition party CHADEMA, whose members of
parliament had taken a strong anti-corruption stance both in parliament and
during the election campaign, increased the vote for its presidential candidate
from 6% in 2005 to 27% in 2010. Its seats in parliament also increased, from 5
in 2005 to 23 in 2010, with the result that the party presented the strongest
opposition challenge to CCM since the first multi-party elections.
In his inaugural speech to parliament after winning his second term,
President Kikwete responded to the impact that the issue of corruption had had
on the popularity of CCM, in spite of the actions his government had taken:
in the past five years we took steps to build the legal, systemic and
institutional capacity to fight corruption in this country. We enacted new,
stronger laws, which have a broader capacity to fight the problem of
105Kikwete, ‘Speech by the president’.
106CCM, Ilani ya uchaguzi ya CCM kwa ajili ya uchaguzi mkuu wa mwaka 2010 [Election
manifesto of CCM for the general election 2010] (Dodoma, 2010), 26.
107CCM, Ilani ya uchaguzi 2010.
108CCM, Ilani ya uchaguzi 2010.
109‘Wabunge wakomalia mabilioni ya Dowans’ [‘MPs query Dowans’s billions’], Uhuru, 11
December 2010, 1, 4; ‘Richmond probe team gets down to business’, This Day, 16 November
2007; ‘Dr. Salim azungumzia ufisadi’ [‘Dr Salim talks about corruption’], Kulikoni, 19 October
2007, 1, 2; Mkombe Zanda, ‘Sasa wataka tume huru kuchunguza ufisadi’ [‘An independent
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corruption. Also we have enacted a law on election funds. We have created a
new instrument to prevent and fight corruption, PCCB [Prevention and
Combating of Corruption Bureau], with more legal powers and more
resources to carry out its responsibilities. It is an open truth that in this
period [2005–10] many allegations have been put forward, investigated and
brought to court. Many of the accused have been found to be guilty and have
been convicted. Major corruption has been dealt with and many important
people have been held accountable. Despite that there is a need to do more
because the problem of corruption is still significant. I have heard the
demand of our country men and women that we have to do much better.
We shall increase our efforts in this fight.110
CONCLUSION
Since the introduction of multi-party elections in Tanzania in 1995, CCM has
won both the presidential elections and the parliamentary elections by a
comfortable majority. However, as CCM had emerged from the regime party of a
single-party state that enjoyed widespread legitimacy and popular support, any
drop in electoral support is seen as a threat to its traditional position and an
indication of the danger that an opposition party may emerge that could mount
an effective electoral challenge and replace it as the government. To date, no
single opposition party has provided an effective challenge over more than one
electoral cycle, and CCM has fought its political battles mainly against public
opinion. During the multi-party period the conduct of elections has improved,
to the point where they were considered free and fair in 2005. Also during this
period, CCM has continued to place the emphasis of its election campaigns on
its political response to public concerns, even though it failed to fulfil the public’s
expectations after the elections. Through the four cycles of multi-party elections,
the capacity of CCM to deliver on its manifesto has influenced party fortunes,
with its success fluctuating from one election to the next. CCM has built on its
legacy as the founding regime party, but the extent to which this legacy has been
used has diminished over time, with the previous government’s performance
becoming a much more important part of the political ideas and rhetoric used to
persuade voters to support the party. The fact that corruption has remained such
a dominant political issue in Tanzania, and has proved so difficult for CCM to
tackle effectively, indicates that a level of corruption is endemic in the state, but
this does not mean that there is a link between Tanzania’s having a dominant
party and the current levels of corruption. CCM, as the dominant party, has
been increasingly forced by high levels of public awareness, strong public
criticism and strenuous political debate to take effective action on corruption.
However, the complexity of CCM as an organisation and the factionalism within
it make tackling corruption more difficult, as the party has multiple centres of
power and influence. To date, however, Tanzania’s dominant-party system has
existed alongside an improvement in democratic practice and an increasingly
free political debate. The high level of political debate during election campaigns
and the importance that CCM places on the use of political ideas and policy in
the context of its legitimacy narrative during elections indicate a political system
in which there is a complex relationship between the dominant political party
and the electorate. This relationship demonstrates that the political system is
based on a definite political community with shared ideas and expectations, even
if those expectations frequently remain unfulfilled.
110Kikwete, ‘Speech by the president’.
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